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A year ago, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted four bills on the policy of national memory: on 
granting access to the archives of the repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime 
in the years 1917–1991, on the legal status and commemoration of Ukrainian independence 
fighters in the twentieth century, on the immortalisation of the victory over Nazism in the 
Second World War, 1939–1945, and on the condemnation of the Communist and National So-
cialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and the forbidding of their symbolism from being promoted. 
The laws came into force on 21 May 2015. After a year, it can be stated that only the latter 
two are being observed – the official narrative regarding World War II has been changed, 
mainly due to the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR), but 
also as a result of public statements by President Petro Poroshenko. The process of removing 
from public places the names and commemorations referring to the Soviet era is underway, 
and the fears that this may trigger serious conflicts have not proved true. From roughly a tho-
usand placenames subject to de-communisation some two thirds have been changed so far 
(parliamentary bills regarding the remaining ones are awaiting approval) and most statues of 
Communist leaders have been removed. However, the law concerning independence fighters, 
which raised the most serious controversies, did not have any practical consequences. Moreo-
ver, nothing suggests that this could change. The implementation of the de-communisation 
laws is associated with a significant change in Ukrainian patriotic narrative: it is no longer 
focused on national martyrdom and it is beginning to emphasize heroic motives, which is in 
line with wartime needs. The fact that some of these motives are likely to trigger problems in 
Ukraine’s relations with Poland seems to be viewed as a marginal ‘by-product’. 
The law on the status of independence 
fighters
The law concerning Ukrainian independece 
fighters was essentially a declarative act, its 
implementation did not require any further ac-
tion, and its principal goal was achieved when 
it came into force. It acknowledged the im-
portance of the fighters’ struggle for Ukraine’s 
independence in 1917–1991 in the context of 
the restoration of the Ukrainian state in 1991. 
However, it did not recognise these fighters as 
combatants (the reasons included the fact that 
most of the organisations listed in the law were 
civilian organisations). The law mentions the 
intention to grant ‘legal status’ to those indi-
viduals, although it fails to provide any details 
regarding this status or specify how it would be 
confirmed or granted to a specific individual. Al-
though this law has now been in force for over 
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a year, during this period no actions were taken 
to grant this status to former fighters (in prac-
tice – OUN-UPA veterans and dissidents active 
in the 1960’s through to the 1980’s) or offer 
them certain concessions and social benefits.
The law committed the state to increase its 
efforts to research into and to propagate the 
knowledge of the struggle for Ukrainian inde-
pendence in the 20th century and to revere the 
memory of this struggle. It also included a pro-
vision saying that expressing “contempt” for 
independence fighters, attempting to prevent 
their rights from being pursued, as well as pub-
licly denying the legitimacy of the struggle for 
Ukraine’s independence are illegal and shall be 
penalised according to the law in effect. How-
ever, it failed to specify the details. So far, no 
attempt has been made to incorporate this ban 
into the penal code (in its present wording the 
provision included in the act cannot form the 
basis for action by the prosecutor’s office and 
by the courts) and there is no indication that 
such initiatives will be carried out soon.
Contrary to fears voiced, for example, by some 
historians, the act’s provisions are not being 
used to hinder academic research and critical 
reflection on the activity of OUN-UPA. This 
reflection emerged in Ukraine around 2010. 
However, it later vanished, which was a conse-
quence of the war and this happened before 
the laws discussed in this article were adopted.
The state’s commitment to increase its efforts 
to research into and to propagate the knowl-
edge of the struggle for Ukraine’s indepen-
dence in the 20th century and to revere the 
memory of this struggle is being implemented 
almost exclusively by the UINR, which is car-
rying out measures which are dynamic and 
multifaceted. These include devising method-
ological papers and materials to be used in the 
media, as well as inspiring changes in school 
curricula which are being gradually imple-
mented. The Institute strives, for instance, to 
include the struggle (mainly against the Soviet 
Union) by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 
in the national and state tradition which is 
generally seen in a positive light. At the same 
time, it has no intention of rejecting dialogue 
with Poland. One element of this dialogue 
naturally involves discussion on the subject of 
UPA crimes. A Polish-Ukrainian Forum of His-
torians has been established on the initiative 
of the UINR and Poland’s Institute of National 
Remembrance and has launched its activities.
The status of the Ukrainian Institute of Nation-
al Remembrance is that of a central executive 
body subordinated to the government. Its 
tasks involve realisation of the state’s histor-
ical policy (in practice, it is the Institute that 
defines the lines of this policy). However, it has 
no investigative competences, no right to car-
ry out lustration or to establish field offices. It 
is a rather small institution with several doz-
en employees and a limited budget. The UINR 
owes its present significance mainly to the 
dynamism of its head, Volodymyr Viatrovych, 
a young historian with an impressive research 
track record, a participant in the Revolution of 
Dignity, who has shown no political ambitions 
so far. Of equal importance is the fact that 
the UINR remains outside the rivalry between 
various political groups, as it only has limited 
funds at its disposal. 
De-communisation of the public space
The implementation of the law providing for the 
removal of names and symbols associated with 
Communism from public places has proved the 
Contrary to fears, the provisions of the 
act on the legal status of independence 
fighters are not being used to hinder ac-
ademic research and critical reflection 
on the activity of OUN-UPA.
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most difficult mainly due to the large number 
of objects covered by it. Furthermore, there 
were fears that the process may trigger disputes 
and social protests as well as attempts at using 
these for political purposes. These fears turned 
out to be exaggerated: attempts at using the 
issue in the campaign ahead of local elections 
were few and far between, and after the elec-
tions de-communisation initiatives gained mo-
mentum. However, residents of some towns 
opposed the changes (in particular involving 
the renaming of streets), although their resis-
tance was not particularly forceful. The planned 
activities did not manage to be fully imple-
mented within the six-month period specified 
in the act, though the process is underway. 
It can be assumed that it will have been com-
pleted by the end of this year (obviously, only 
on those territories under government control). 
The plan to rename certain towns and streets 
was largely approved of by the general public, 
facilitated by the fact that it did not entail the 
necessity of changing identity documents etc., 
and the process of removing statues, commem-
orative plaques and symbols associated with 
the Soviet state was hedged with a provision 
to guarantee that the statues located in ceme-
teries as well as other works of funerary art will 
remain intact.
The present de-communisation mainly cov-
ers the central, southern and eastern parts of 
Ukraine; in western regions it was carried out 
back in the 1990’s when certain towns and 
streets were renamed and Communist-era stat-
ues were removed. Only 17 local names remain 
to be changed in western Ukraine. The de-com-
munisation laws are not being implemented on 
the territory controlled by the Russian Federa-
tion and separatists. The UINR has drafted a list 
of new names of towns located in these regions 
(including Crimea). For obvious reasons, in its 
work it has omitted the task of consulting with 
local residents about the plans. 
By the middle of May 2016, out of 941 districts 
and localities (including 76 cities and towns) 
indicated by the UINR, 688 places (including 
56 cities and towns) had their names official-
ly changed. Bills containing the proposed new 
names for the remainder have been registered 
with the Parliament of Ukraine and are wait-
ing to be passed. Their adoption has been de-
layed due to the generally poor organisation of 
parliamentary work. The renaming initiatives 
are subject to consultation with local author-
ities (aside from the territories outside Kyiv’s 
control). In around 40 cases the name change 
raised controversy (mainly centred around dis-
putes as to whether the specific name was in-
deed associated with the Communist regime; 
for example names such as Petrivka/Petrivtse 
could have been inspired by St Peter or Bolshe-
vik Grigory Petrovsky). 
The proposed renaming of two big cities, Dni-
propetrovsk and Kirovohrad, and the respec-
tive regions, remains in the realm of plans 
and the last will require the constitution to be 
amended, as it contains the list of all regions. 
In both cases, restoring of these cities’ his-
torical names is out of the question, as these 
are connected with Russian rule over Ukraine 
(Ekaterinoslav – to commemorate Empress 
Catherine the Great, and Elisavetgrad – to 
commemorate Empress Elizabeth of Russia, 
respectively). As far as Dnipropetrovsk is con-
cerned, the popular abbreviated name Dnipro 
(Dnieper) will most likely be adopted. The au-
thorities of Kirovohrad, on the other hand, are 
striving to restore the city’s historical name, 
suggesting that it was derived from St Eliza-
In most cases, the renaming involves re-
storing a historical name. If no historical 
names are available, new names are in-
vented, derived from rivers and other geo-
graphical landmarks.
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beth. The UINR has objected to this and ini-
tially proposed the name Inhulsk (from the 
river Inhul on which the city is located), and 
then the name Kropyvnytski (from the name 
of the Ukrainian 19th-century writer and actor 
who lived in the town). Neither of these names 
was approved by the city’s residents and the 
matter is likely to trigger further disputes. 
In most cases, the renaming involves restor-
ing a historical name (for example Artemivsk 
became Bakhmut again, and Volodarsk-Volyn-
skyi became Khoroshiv). If no historical names 
are available, new names are invented, derived 
from rivers and other geographical landmarks. 
New commemorative names are very rare (only 
10 such names have been proposed, none of 
which refer to events which took place in the 
20th century1). 
The number of streets, etc., subject to renam-
ing has reached into the tens of thousands. The 
renaming initiatives are the task of local gov-
ernment and therefore no comprehensive fig-
ures regarding this matter are available. What 
is known, however, is that the process has been 
completed in numerous towns and in the Za-
karpattia region. In early May 2016, the head 
of the UINR announced that 2,500 streets have 
been renamed. In the case of streets, restor-
ing historical names is rarely possible, so new 
1 The renaming of Komsomolske (in Kherson region) to 
Dontsove can be seen as an exception; the historical 
name of this village was Shkarlupky. There is no evi-
dence to verify whether the new name has been derived 
from D. Dontsov (ideologist of Ukrainian radical nation-
alism, unrelated to the region) or had a different source. 
commemorative names are used instead, con-
nected mainly with Ukraine’s struggle for inde-
pendence (including actions by OUN-UPA) and 
with the Revolution of Dignity and the war in 
the east of the country (these are mainly the 
names of individuals killed in war, adopted in 
the towns from which they originated). The in-
troduction of names referring to the struggle 
for independence frequently meets with resis-
tance on the part of local residents, who prefer 
neutral-sounding names. 
The situation is much worse in the case of re-
moving the names of Communist-era figures 
from the official names of industrial plants and 
other institutions. Here, similarly, no compre-
hensive data is available. However, it seems 
meaningful that the military shipbuilding com-
pany in Kyiv is still referred to as ‘Leninska Ku-
znya’. The process of removing the statues of 
Lenin and other Communist leaders had been 
progressing well in the central part of the 
country until 2013 (from 5,500 Lenin statues 
which existed in 1990 only 2,200 were left in 
December 2013; no figures are available for 
other statues covered by the removal process). 
During the Revolution of Dignity and directly 
afterwards there was a surge in the initiatives 
focused on removing such statues (in 2014 
alone as many as 504 were removed). In 2015, 
the process continued, sometimes causing re-
sistance on the part of local government (as in 
Dnipropetrovsk, where in January 2016 a huge 
statue of Petrovsky, the city’s Communist ‘pa-
tron’, was removed upon the initiative of local 
activists ). In mid-March 2016, on territories 
controlled by Ukraine’s central government 
there were still several hundred Lenin statues 
(including 10 in Kyiv); most of these are locat-
ed on the premises of industrial complexes etc. 
These statues are being gradually removed 
(for example, in early April 2016 in Mariupol 
a statue of Ordzhonikidze was removed; earli-
er in Zaporizhzhya statues of Lenin and Dzer-
zhynsky were removed). It should be expected 
The de-communisation law directly prohib-
ited the use of the word ‘Communist’ in or-
ganisational names. This was tantamount to 
a ban on the activity of the Communist Party 
of Ukraine.
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that this aspect of de-communisation will be 
completed in time, that is by 21 May 2016. This 
will be facilitated by the fact that on 4 April the 
Minister of Culture deprived 794 such statues 
of the status of historical monuments (some of 
them had already been removed by that time). 
The de-communisation law directly prohibited 
the use of the word ‘Communist’ in organisa-
tional names. This was tantamount to a ban on 
the activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine. 
The Communists, severely weakened by the an-
nexation of Crimea and the rebellion in Don-
bas (these were the regions where most of the 
Communist party voters, as well as activists, 
lived) and their party’s absence from parlia-
ment following the 2014 elections, attempted 
to oppose this decision. However, first they 
were prevented from running in local elections 
in 2015, and then the activity of their party was 
banned by a legally valid court decision. 
Implementation of the remaining acts
The act changing the official narrative regard-
ing World War II has been fully implemented. 
A large portion of the implementation initia-
tives was carried out prior to when the act 
came into force. In 2015 and 2016, celebrations 
of the anniversary of the end of World War II 
were organised both on 8 May (Day of Remem-
brance and Reconciliation) and on 9 May (Day 
of Victory over Nazism), and the term ‘Great 
Patriotic War’ was eliminated from the official 
narrative. It was replaced with the term ‘World 
War II’, which was intended to popularise the 
participation of Ukrainians in the ranks of vari-
ous armies (including the Polish Armed Forces), 
with special emphasis on the significance of the 
war with Japan. The UINR has been involved in 
a wide-ranging initiative to popularise the new 
narrative, according to which Ukraine was an 
independent participant in this war and one 
of the allies (the fact that it collaborated with 
the Third Reich has been omitted, similarly to 
the crimes perpetrated by UPA). This explicit 
heroic interpretation of the past is in line with 
the needs of a country which is waging a war. 
Back in 2015, this interpretation was not being 
officially challenged, whereas in 2016 in some 
towns supporters of the ‘old’ narrative empha-
sising the Great Patriotic War used the oppor-
tunity of anniversary celebrations to openly 
demonstrate their views. 
The implementation of the act relating to ar-
chives, pursuant to which the UINR was to take 
over the entire archives of all law enforcement 
bodies of the former USSR from the years 1917–
1991, is underway. The first stage of this imple-
mentation, involving compiling an inventory of 
the resources by their current administrators, is 
expected to be complete by May 2016. At pres-
ent, it is not known whether these resources 
will be grouped together in a new site or will 
remain in their current home institutions. 
Closing remarks
The implementation of the de-communisation 
laws is visibly changing Ukraine’s political land-
scape, both in its physical aspect (the removal 
of statues, etc.) and its intellectual-moral aspect 
(eliminating the remains of the Soviet historical 
and social narrative from popular awareness). 
The authorities in Kyiv (mainly the leadership 
of the UINR and President Poroshenko) are ac-
tively promoting the new narrative of historical 
remembrance, whose main motive is no longer 
The implementation of the de-communi-
sation laws is visibly changing Ukraine’s 
political landscape, both in its physical 
aspect (the removal of statues etc.) and 
its intellectual-moral aspect (eliminating 
the remains of the Soviet historical and 
social narrative from popular awareness).
6OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 211
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk 
Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska  
TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz 
Co-operation: Timothy Harrell 
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
martyrdom (centred around the memory of 
Holodomor), but the heroic struggle against in-
vaders (Russia in particular, but also Poland and 
Hungary). What is important in this context is 
that, in the new vision of World War II, empha-
sis is placed on the joint struggle by residents 
of Ukraine of different nationalities. This narra-
tive responds to the needs of a country which 
is waging a war and facing the task of inte-
grating the ethnically divided society into one 
political nation. It should not be expected that 
Kyiv will abandon this narrative, regardless of 
the difficulties that the fact of emphasising the 
memory of the struggle by Ukrainian nation-
alists may provoke in Ukraine’s relations with 
Russia and Poland. The former are considered 
a natural element of the present conflict, while 
the latter seem to be viewed as an unavoidable, 
minor ‘by-product’ of the patriotic consolida-
tion of the nation.
